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Monitoring Police Reform in Cincinnati

Alan S. Kalmanoff, PhD
Institute for Law and Policy Planning

This is the story of my brief and tumultuous tenure as a court-appointed Independent Monitor of two agreements reached by the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, with several other parties. The "Collaborative Agreement" settled a class-action lawsuit against the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) charging decades of racial profiling. The "Memorandum of Agreement" between the City and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) settled a Justice Department review of local police policies and practices initiated after race riots erupted following the police killing of an unarmed black man (see Background). I believe this cautionary tale contains useful lessons for other masters, trustees, and monitors in complex conflicts.


A Cautionary Tale

ILPP staff, team members and I were elated in Fall, 2002, to win a large, five-year appointment to serve as Independent Monitor of two historic agreements that seemed to promise significant police reform and improved community relations in racially-troubled Cincinnati. For me, the appointment as Monitor represented a culmination of three decades of work, a kind of capstone for some 300 ILPP contracts with states, counties, and cities on all aspects of the criminal justice system. Our reputation as criminal justice system monitors, investigators, planners, and experts was well established. More than 100 client letters substantiate ILPP's success in performing the kind of review, planning, and oversight work requested in Cincinnati.

We knew when we responded in May, 2002, to the City's "Request for the Services of an Independent Monitor" that we had a strong proposal, with a team of experts on police reform that few other proposals could match.1 We were also confident that we had a low bid; as a small non-profit organization, we have made our living by competing successfully against larger, more bureaucratic, for-profit firms. (For example, Nixon Peabody estimated a total of $5.6 million to serve as Monitor;2 our proposed budget was $3.9 million, $1.7 million lower.) The 11 applicants for Monitor included distinguished firms and accomplished individuals, including two who are relevant to this story: Andrew Douglas, then a sitting justice on the Ohio Supreme Court; and Saul Green, a former U.S. Attorney, now the current monitor.

U.S. District Judge Susan Dlott approached ILPP about becoming the Cincinnati Monitor on Friday, September 27, 2002, after the parties failed twice to meet her deadline for appointing a monitor. Exercising her authority under the Collaborative Agreement, at a press conference on October 10, Judge Dlott announced that she had appointed me and ILPP's team as monitor. Nearly everyone in the room, including the plaintiffs in the racial profiling case and attorneys for the parties, was visibly shocked at the news.3

Nonetheless, initial media coverage was generally positive, and reactions by the parties seemed supportive: City Manager Valerie Lemmie said that, although the Judge's appointment had caught the city off-guard, "what really counts is that the monitor has now been identified. It is a group with a wealth of experience. We look forward to moving forward."4 Mayor Charles Luken said, "Dr. Kalmanoff is known for balance and fairness, and the city looks forward to his leadership."5 The president of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP, the police union) said that the Judge "had to step in and make the decision," and that the FOP was "dedicated to working with" the Monitor.6

On the plaintiffs' side, the Black United Front (BUF), which had strongly favored Justice Douglas as monitor, accepted Judge Dlott's choice, as ILPP was "one of their finalists." The ACLU attorney called ILPP "a very qualified group" with "some of the best community policing people in the world, not just the nation, on their team."7 In sum, although the parties had not been able to agree, and were clearly caught by surprise, "all sides were satisfied with the outcome and hopeful about the future."

An Enquirer editorial accurately reported that the five-year Collaborative Agreement provides for "the monitor to hire experts to assist him at reasonable costs not to exceed $1 million a year without the parties reconsidering the schedule for compliance." The editorial said, "Justice Douglas is expected to serve as the monitor's Ohio representative after retiring from the Ohio Supreme Court later this year. Judge Dlott called the group a 'dream team.'" The editorial called on the parties to show genuine collaboration: "All parties need to pull together to make this deal a success. We should make it a national model of how a city can move beyond riots, disputed police shootings and racial distrust to a new spirit of mutual respect."8

Unfortunately, the City was not ready to collaborate—it was not ready to accept its financial obligations or the imposition of a court-appointed monitor. From October 13-23, city officials used deceit, media-created confusion, and errors about the cost and duration of the monitorship to undermine its legitimacy, which set the stage for them to reject Judge Dlott's choice as monitor.9 An October 16 story made it appear that the monitor, less than a week after his appointment, was laying the groundwork to expand both the cost and the duration of the monitorship. An October 23 story erroneously stated that the ILPP budget proposal was $7.5 million over five years rather than $3.9 million; this mistake was never publicly corrected. Rather than correcting the record and acknowledging their financial obligations under the agreements, city officials chose instead to lie directly about the costs, and position themselves as "good stewards" of the taxpayer's dollar,10 and set the stage for the City to withdraw from the agreement. The Enquirer headline of October 23 read "Mayor: City might 'rethink deal.'" (See Media Coverage, Oct. 13-23 for details.)

After the city received the first ILPP bill, submitted at their request on November 4, the bill was immediately released to the media. "Outraged" city officials issued derogatory comments impugning my integrity and character. I am caricatured (e.g., "Dr. Ripoff"), derided for several small items in my bill, and cartooned as a California lawyer who needed to be brought under control.11 (See "Billing Dispute" for details.) Mayor Luken and the Cincinnati City Council threatened to withdraw from the Collaborative Agreement unless I was fired.12 On November 6, the City Council voted unanimously to challenge Judge Dlott's appointment of me as Independent Monitor; they voted not to pay my bill and ordered me to stop working.13 Some stories were particularly damaging to me personally, citing false, distorted and one-sided comments from supposedly dissatisfied former clients, and creating the impression that we were incompetent and greedy opportunists. Such stories continued even after I resigned as monitor on November 13, as I sought payment for fees and expenses incurred by the ILPP team.

Even as city leaders were decrying the "outrageous" bill, they were routinely paying another outside attorney greater amounts at far higher rates for similar services. As was revealed in an Enquirer story on November 17, "the same Cincinnati officials who lambasted a Berkeley, Calif., lawyer appointed to monitor police reform over his $55,000 bill have quietly paid another outside lawyer more than $1 million for similar charges in the past 15 months."14 From June 2001 forward, Billy Martin and his firm had been billing an average of $68,963 per month to represent the city in the Collaborative Agreement.15 Martin's rate was $225 per hour, compared to our $100 per hour.

Virtually every story since my resignation has suggested either that I was fired over my bill or that I quit because the city would not pay it—neither of which is at all true. The so-called "billing dispute" was only the final stage of the drama. It is not uncommon for cities subject to court-appointed monitors to divert attention from reform mandates by resisting paying for them or attacking the reputation of the Monitor. As this account shows, the monitorship was effectively sabotaged well before ILPP submitted the initial bill to the City.

As I said in my November 13 resignation letter to Judge Dlott, I had "become a lightening rod for the resistance the City government and Cincinnati Police Department have towards the idea of being monitored, especially under the leadership of and direction of someone who had no allegiances."

What was it that torpedoed our Cincinnati monitorship so quickly and so decisively? In part, the events can be read as the City's adroit exploitation of media errors and distortions to discredit Judge Dlott's surprise choice and regain some control over the choice of a monitor. It is a textbook example of the actions of an intransigent city resistant to institutional change and subject to an externally-imposed Independent Monitor.

But three conditions at the time of our appointment probably doomed the monitorship from the outset. First, the "Twitty Affair" the previous summer exacerbated tensions between the police department and the black community and deepened distrust among and between the parties, who were unable to agree on the choice of a monitor. Whatever spirit of collaboration there might have been in April when the agreements were signed had disappeared by October. Second, working without a contract, an escrow account, or an agreed-on payment mechanism undermined the independence of the monitorship and made it vulnerable to the "billing dispute." Third, the City perceived the appointment of Justice Andrew Douglas as a "senior advisor" to the team as a back-door move by the Judge to impose on them someone they had steadfastly opposed as Monitor. As it turned out, Justice Douglas had failed to disclose prior relationships with two of the other parties, relationships that clearly disqualified him.

The "Twitty Affair"

Racial tensions and distrust of the Cincinnati Police Department by the black community were exacerbated over the Summer, 2002, by the public suspension on June 12 of the department's highest ranking black officer, Lt. Col. Ron Twitty. He was indicted on September 3; his plea agreement a week later allowed him to retire with his pension. (See timeline.) A Cincinnati Post cartoon on September 5, captioned "Twitty or Not-Twitty," captured the divisive mood in Cincinnati. Angry public debate continued about how Twitty's successor would be chosen. The Cincinnati Enquirer published its own study that appeared to show that the department disciplined black officers more often than white officers.16 In November, a former police officer filed a $40 million suit against the police department, claiming that "city officials routinely target African-American officers with false charges and unfair discipline ... to run them out of the police department."17

I interviewed Lt. Col. Twitty (as well as Police Chief Thomas Streicher and others) on October 12, two days after my appointment was announced, after I learned that the black police officers' union considered this a case of biased policing and feared that the evidence would be covered up. I had not followed the Cincinnati press over the summer, and did not fully appreciate at the time the significance that city officials might attach to my decision to interview Twitty. I now believe that my interview, coming so soon after my appointment, put city officials on the defensive, as they assumed that I would likely pursue this case of alleged biased policing.

Twitty Affair Timeline

At a press conference on July 12, Police Chief Charles Streicher publicly suspended Lt. Col. (and Assistant Chief) Ron Twitty, a 29-year veteran of the force and CPD's highest-ranking black officer. Twitty, who had often been the CPD representative with the black community, was suspended pending investigation of the veracity of an accident report he filed less than a week earlier explaining how his city-owned car had sustained $3,000 damage.18

Angry reaction from the black community and private organizations was swift. Protesters marched in front of police headquarters; the Black United Front criticized the department for publicly humiliating its highest-ranking black officer, and accused it of racial-profiling its own officers.19 The BUF said that the city was trying to "pick off black leaders,"20 and some leaders suggested that the department's action was intended to prevent a senior black officer from being promoted to Chief of Police.21 Chief Streicher's action also sowed dissension within the CPD; Cincinnati's black police officers' union criticized the FOP for failing to vigorously defend Twitty.22 In the wake of the negative publicity, the National Urban League announced that it would cancel plans to meet in Cincinnati for its 2003 conference.

On September 3, just two months after Lt. Col. Twitty filed his accident report, a grand jury convened by Hamilton County District Attorney Michael Allen (himself under fire for lying about an affair with an employee23) indicted Twitty on several charges. On September 10, Twitty pled "no contest" to the charges, a negotiated plea that allowed him to retire with his pension. (Coincidentally or not, this was the day that the parties missed Judge Dlott's final deadline for choosing a Monitor.) For many Cincinnatians, the sad, humiliating end of Lt. Col. Twitty's career only reinforced the impression that racism was deeply imbedded in the CPD.24

Working Without a Contract

Future monitors beware: Working without a contract in a volatile, antagonistic political environment is like walking the high wire without a net, in a strong wind. Working as a court-ordered independent monitor where the City is obliged to pay the bills, as I was in Cincinnati, is even riskier. The ILPP team began work on September 30, three days after Judge Dlott offered us the job as monitor. The Judge said that delays in ratifying the contract and the parties' inability to appoint a monitor had put the monitorship behind schedule, and she had a long list of items to be addressed. We were working in good faith under the aegis of the Court, and on the authority of Judge Dlott.

On October 11, the day after she surprised Cincinnati with our appointment as Monitor, Judge Dlott asked the city attorney to draft a contract for the monitorship. Drafts later forwarded to me seemed designed to renegotiate the Collaborative Agreement rather than confirm its terms.25 No contract was ever consummated. But any contract would have put the City, a party to the agreements, in charge of the purse strings, an untenable compromise of the monitor's independence making the monitorship vulnerable to exactly the sort of "billing issue" that in fact developed. The best way to preserve the monitor's independence is through an escrow account, with monitor fees and expenses paid by the Court. Former U.S. Attorney Saul Green, the current monitor, learned from our experience and wisely insisted that an escrow account be established.26

The reluctance of the City to live up to its financial obligation could perhaps have been anticipated. The City had refused to pay the plantiffs' legal fees in the racial profiling case settled by the Collaborative Agreement. The plaintiff's legal bill for $600,000 provoked a dispute with city officials over how much the attorneys should be paid and who would pay it. In that instance, the Court intervened; Judge Dlott refused to ratify the April agreement until August, when the city committed to placing at least part of the payment in an escrow account. Thereafter, plaintiffs' attorneys' bills were submitted to and approved by the Court, and paid directly from the escrow account.27

On October 28, the plantiffs attorneys wrote a letter to the Court and two of the parties to the Collaborative Agreement (the City and the Fraternal Order of Police) requesting that the parties agree to pay the monitor through a court-controlled escrow account similar to that instituted earlier on their behalf.28 Judge Dlott promised that she would help get the escrow system implemented, and scheduled a meeting with the parties for late November to iron out the details of the escrow account system.29 Unfortunately, we did not have that much time. When the monitorship was seriously jeopardized in the second week of November, we urged the Judge to move quickly and decisively to order the city to set up an escrow account, but she did not do so.30

Justice Andrew Douglas

When Judge Dlott contacted me about accepting the Monitorship on September 27, she made one request—that I add Justice Andrew Douglas to the ILPP team as a "senior advisor." My immediate reaction was that I could not accept the job with that condition; on the face of it, Douglas, then a sitting justice on the Ohio Supreme Court, would have conflicts making his addition to the team inappropriate. Judge Dlott assured me that Douglas had no conflicts, that he was very loyal and honest, and that he would be useful to our team because of his knowledge of the situation and politics in Cincinnati. When I interviewed Justice Douglas in Dayton the following week, he assured me that he had no conflicts of interest or prior relationships with any of the parties, that he was more than willing to work under my direction, and that he would not give interviews to the press without my express permission. On that basis, I agreed to accept him as a "senior advisor" after he retired from the Court. I proposed to wait to make Douglas's involvement known until after his term expired at the end of the year, but Judge Dlott insisted that Douglas be identified as a senior advisor to the ILPP team when she introduced me as her choice as Monitor.

Justice Douglas was unacceptable to Police Chief Striecher and other city officials, and he was deemed incompetent by the Department of Justice to monitor the Memorandum of Agreement.31 I did not know that Justice Douglas's campaign for the monitorship included writing a letter to DOJ on July 15 saying that he would be "willing and pleased to be a co-monitor"—demonstrating that he had been kept up to date on the supposedly secret proceedings of the parties attempting to select a monitor.32

Moreover, as was publicly revealed on November 20, Saul Green had been offered the monitorship before I was appointed, but had turned it down on September 20 (exactly one week before Judge Dlott offered the job to ILPP), in part because he was unwilling to accept Justice Douglas as deputy monitor. Green said that "he envisioned a 'hands on' operational deputy position that he felt would not be appropriate for Justice Douglas."33

Justice Douglas's appointment as "senior advisor" made him visible but not manageable. Still sitting on the Ohio Supreme Court, not due to start officially as an ILPP advisor until the following January, he was not accountable to the monitor. Justice Douglas immediately violated all three elements of the understanding I had with him: He did talk to the press without my permission, he undermined my authority and perceived independence, and he did have serious undisclosed conflicts of interest. I would caution against hiring or relying on a figure with ties to the judge or a party.34 Powerful, well-connected people are generally accustomed to giving rather than taking orders; they might prove unwilling or unable to accept a subordinate role.35 They also might not be able to resist talking to the press, which, in my case, became a serious problem.36

As was later revealed, Douglas had prior relationships with both the FOP and the BUF, and he had a close social political and personal relationship with Judge Dlott and her husband. By November 11, I had learned that Justice Douglas had made improper promises to the lead of the BUF (He said he had secured a well-paid position for Juleana Frierson with the Supreme Court's ethics committee.37), and had had business dealings with the FOP (he said he had chosen their general counsel)—and I found out that Judge Dlott knew of these improprieties. I asked a trusted senior team member to meet with Judge Dlott to ascertain whether, in light of these improprieties, she would support removing Justice Douglas from the team. Judge Dlott expressed her continued confidence in me, but she refused to support removing Justice Douglas. Believing that my independence as monitor had been compromised and that I no longer had the full support of the Court, I submitted my resignation on November 13.

In the weeks following my resignation, local pundits predicted that Justice Douglas would be named the new monitor. But Douglas was still unacceptable to some of the parties and, after three intense days of negotiation, the parties selected the monitor they had approved in the first place, former U.S. Attorney Saul Green.38 Richard Jerome, another monitor finalist who had coordinated the DOJ's police integrity efforts in 2001, was appointed as deputy monitor. Not only was Mr. Green unanimously selected, he was able to negotiate a good arrangement for the independence of the monitorship: He is paid through an escrow account, and his 5-year budget is $6.5 million rather than the $5 million cap the city was previously so adamant to maintain.

Despite these ideal conditions for the monitorship, Mr. Green's first six quarterly reports criticized the City and the CPD for recalcitrance and resistance to change. In his first quarterly report (April 2003), Green criticized the city for "dragging its feet on reform."39 The next five quarterly reports also criticized the police department for its slow pace of reform.40 In September 2004, after nearly two years of work, Green told reporters that "Cincinnati continues to fall short of its goal in several areas, such as encouraging police and residents to work more closely and making community-oriented policing a bigger part of police training."41

At this writing, as the 5-year time period specified in the Agreements approaches its end, the ultimate fate of police reform in Cincinnati remains to be seen.


In April 2002, the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, reached closure with several other parties on two historic accords, the "Collaborative Agreement" and the "Memorandum of Agreement" (MOA), designed to implement major reforms in the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD).

The "Collaborative Agreement" settled a class-action lawsuit filed in March 2001 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Black United Front (BUF, a local citizens group) and others (28 others joined the suit, adding specific allegations) against the CPD, alleging three decades of "racial profiling" (discrimination based on race) against African-Americans by the police. The case was assigned to U.S. Circuit Judge Susan Dlott, who already had a two-year-old race-profiling case working its way through her docket, the case of Bomani Tyehimba. (Tyehimba charged that police officers illegally drew their weapons on him and his seven-year-old child during a routine traffic stop.)

The MOA, between the City of Cincinnati and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), brought to an end a federal review of local police policies and practices, especially those regarding the use of force. The review stemmed from a series of events in April 2001, the month after the class action suit was filed. On April 7, 2001, a white police officer shot and killed Timothy Thomas, a young, unarmed black man wanted primarily for traffic violations; he was the fifteenth African-American in five years to die in confrontations with Cincinnati police. Rioting and looting broke out in downtown Cincinnati on April 10, and continued for several days. Property damage from these and smaller riots throughout Greater Cincinnati was estimated in the millions of dollars.

In the wake of the riots, Mayor Charles Luken requested the Justice Department review; DOJ's 14-page report in October 2001 detailed 91 specific corrective steps for reform in the CPD. The City also imposed a curfew on the African-American "Over-the-Rhine" district. Before long, the BUF mounted a boycott of downtown businesses that convinced many individuals and organizations, such as the National Urban League, to take their convention, restaurant and hotel dollars elsewhere.42

In May, a month after the riots, Judge Dlott invited lawyers for the parties in the racial-profiling suit—the City of Cincinnati, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP, the police union), and the plaintiffs, the BUF and the ACLU-to attempt to settle the case out of court. (DOJ joined the settlement talks because its investigation so closely paralleled the issues raised by the lawsuit.)

So, in April 2002, a year after the riots, the parties signed the two Agreements, which contained provisions for an Independent Monitor to assist with implementation and report to the court on the city's progress in achieving the mandated reforms. The two Agreements also specified the city's financial obligations.

The Agreements, Financial Provisions

The Collaborative Agreement, April 2002, committed the City of Cincinnati to spend up to $1 million per year over five years, a total of $5 million, for the costs of monitoring its implementation. The Agreement also included a provision to increase the $5 million cap if necessary, recognizing that the costs of monitoring would depend on compliance. (If, for example, the CPD implacably resisted reform efforts, as has happened elsewhere, the cost of enforcing compliance might well increase.43) Any additional costs would have to be negotiated between and among the parties. Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement between the City and DOJ committed the city to additional expenses, perhaps $2-2.5 million, for new police department technology such as a computer system to track the "use of force" records of individual officers. (The city and state expected the DOJ to help with this funding; in the end, they received far less than anticipated: $1.3 million requested; $315 thousand received.44) Both the MOA and the Collaborative Agreement contained provisions allowing the parties to extend the Monitor's term in the event that reforms were not achieved within the five-year period.45

Judge Dlott gave the parties until September 2 to agree on the selection of a Monitor, reserving her prerogative under the agreement to appoint a Monitor herself if the parties failed to agree.

Media Coverage, October 13-23

During this 11-day period, city officials in Cincinnati adroitly exploited media errors and distortions to distract attention from the city's obligations under the two agreements, and to create the impression that the newly-appointed Independent Monitor was already planning to spend more and stay longer than the agreements provided. My "Ohio representative," Justice Douglas, arranged for me to give an interview to Enquirer reporter Robert Anglen on October 12, two days after my appointment. I saw no compelling reason to do so, since press coverage the previous day of the parties' reactions to our surprise appointment already set the stage for the monitorship. But I hoped that a more personal introduction to the city would reassure the public in general and the parties in particular that we had the expertise and impartiality to help Cincinnati heal.

Sunday, October 13- "Monitor's first steps: Hit ground listening."46

This headline and the account of my first two days as monitor accurately conveys my approach to the Monitorship: Talk to as many people as possible as quickly as possible, in order to begin to understand their different points of view about the Agreements and their implementation. The tone of the article is generally positive, but it highlights my interview with Lt. Col. Twitty, the CPD's highest-ranking black officer who had recently been publicly disgraced and forced into retirement, further exacerbating tensions between the CPD and the black community. My interviewing him so quickly after my appointment no doubt put the city on notice that I intended to look at that case, and thus be a strong, active monitor. (See Twitty Affair).

The article erroneously states that the financial obligation of the city was $1 million; in fact, the Collaborative Agreement specified an obligation of up to $5 million over five years. The article also states that "the cost of the team-which is slated to be in place for five years-is still in negotiation." In fact, the parties had completed negotiations and specified the city's financial obligations the previous April when they approved the two Agreements. What is true—and important—however, is that ILPP was operating without an established payment mechanism-without a contract or escrow account—which would prove disastrous for the monitorship.

Wednesday, October 16- "Monitor's cost could go higher; But city manager says $1 million a year is it."47

Lead sentence: "The monitor appointed by a federal judge to oversee reforms in Cincinnati's police department says his 20-member team could cost taxpayers $7 million or more over the next five years"; moreover, "the job might take longer than the five years called for in the two historic legal settlements the city made this year."48 The article expresses angry reactions of city leaders at the prospect of paying such costs; for example, City Manager Valerie Lemmie reportedly "bristled at the possibility of costs going over $5 million in the next five years."49 She was "adamant that any higher fees would have to be negotiated with the... city's partners in the legal settlements," and that the City Council would have to approve any expenditures above $5 million.50 The Collaborative Agreement does indeed provide that any additional fees or time extensions would have to be negotiated by the parties (see Background), but the article sets up a phony dispute by making it appear that these are the monitor's estimates rather than financial obligations of the city and time provisions specified in the two agreements. Subsequent media reports repeated city officials' angry opposition to paying for additional time or costs; none of these reports, nor any of the city officials quoted, bothered to clarify the terms of the two agreements.

Thursday, October 17- "Council irked by $7M remark. Monitor's spending cap disputed."51

This story cited irate City Council members as objecting to cost figures and saying that the monitor was "overstepping his bounds." The article does cite me as saying that "the $7M is not an estimate of cost of services, but his understanding of the caps in the agreements." But it also questioned the role of the monitor, which was reportedly a "key point of contention" in settlement talks. One council member viewed the monitor's job as "just filing a quarterly report." In the view of some unnamed city officials, the "$1 million cap is for all costs associated with the collaborative agreement, not just monitoring. So every dollar spent on Dr. Kal's monitoring team is one less spent on implementing the community-oriented policing programs he's supposed to monitor, they said." By this logic, the cost of enforcement would actually detract from police reform. While the article says that "council members on all sides of the political spectrum are taking the issue seriously, trying to head off any disagreements about how much the city should pay," the truth is exactly the reverse: They are rallying precisely to bring their disagreements to a head.

I was asked to appear before the City Council's Law Committee to "explain" myself. At the meeting on October 22, Councilmembers DeWine and Reece persisted in repeating the media-distorted budget figures, even though I had just met with them only moments earlier to go over the budget. They knew that the ILPP budget proposal was in fact well under the $5 million provided for in the Collaborative, and DeWine obviously knew what the Agreements stipulated since he chaired the city's law committee when they were being negotiated. Insisting that that I would do only what the Collaborative and MOA provided for, I resisted being drawn into a discussion of what those who had drafted the Agreements had in mind, and responded to all such questions with "no comment." In consequence, I was portrayed on the evening news and in the next day's Enquirer and Post as "waffling," "ambiguous," and "evasive."52 In truth, since I was a court-appointed independent monitor, not an employee of the City of Cincinnati, it would have been inappropriate and unprofessional for me to enter into a debate with the City Council over the merits or meaning of the Collaborative Agreement. To have done so would have demeaned the dignity of the Court, shown disrespect to the parties who helped craft the two Agreements, and undermined my independence as Monitor.53

Wednesday, October 23- "Mayor: City might 'rethink' deal."54

This article set the stage for city officials to use the flap over the Monitor's projected overruns to challenge Judge Dlott's surprise appointment, and reassert some control over the selection and management of the Monitor. But in this article, reporter Robert Anglen added a bizarre twist, an erroneous calculation of the budget in the ILPP proposal, further confusing and inflaming the situation. He had "gotten ahold of" the ILPP application, he told me in an email, and had reviewed our proposed budget for monitoring the two Agreements. Apparently thinking he had uncovered a major new development, he calculated that our projected "total costs add[ed up] to $7.5 million (approx)."55 In fact, our proposed budget was a little more than half that amount, $3.9 million, well below the $5 million figure anticipated in the Collaborative Agreement. Anglen mistakenly added together our projected budgets for monitoring each of the two agreements, separated as required by the application, with our estimate for monitoring both together.

ILPP Budget Proposal

Cincinnati's "Request for Applications to Serve as Independent Monitor" required all applicants to break down their costs three different ways: (1) Costs for the Collaborative Agreement; (2) Costs for the Memorandum of Agreement; and (3) Costs for monitoring both.56 Like other applicants, ILPP prepared three separate budgets. The first broke down the cost of monitoring just the Collaborative Agreement, year-by-year, totaling roughly $2.3 million for all five years. The second budget isolated the cost of monitoring the MOA, projecting a total cost of roughly $1.6 million over five years. The third budget combined the first two, for a cumulative total cost of about $3.9 million for the five-year period.

Despite my email back to him attempting to correct the error, Anglen printed the false figure. Subsequent media reports reproduced his figure uncritically, without even reviewing ILPP's application to check the facts.57

Mayor Luken could easily have corrected the record when Anglen interviewed him for the October 23 story, but instead he said that the city might have to "rethink the agreement" and "reconsider what we are trying to do."58 City Council members eagerly chimed in: Pat DeWine, knowing it was not true, said that any extension in cost or time would "[violate] the deal that the city agreed to when it settled [the] racial profiling lawsuit against police."59 Alicia Reece righteously positioned the Council as "stewards of taxpayer money," and therefore, by implication, morally and legally bound to protect the community from a rapacious Monitor.60 These reactions were disingenuous, and can only have been intended to set the stage to reject the court-appointed monitor or withdraw from the agreements.

The "Billing Dispute"

Judging from the raft of news stories in the Cincinnati, Ohio, media in November and December 2002, one might reasonably conclude that I was fired as the court-appointed monitor of police reform or forced to resign over a billing dispute with the City.61 Virtually every news report about me after I resigned on November 13 uncritically perpetuates the notion that I was either fired over my bill or quit because the City would not pay it.62 The truth is very different.

First, as the City's partners in the agreements (including DOJ), were quick to point out, the City had no authority to fire an Independent Monitor selected and appointed by the Court. The partners also criticized the city for acting unilaterally, without even notifying them. Judge Dlott privately reassured me that the city's barrage of criticism was "mild or typical" compared to what she had been through with them; the Judge expressed continuing confidence in me until the day I resigned.

Second, the City was primed to withdraw from the agreements well before they received the ILPP bill on November 4; it only required a trigger, which the bill provided. Ten days earlier, on October 23, the Enquirer headline read: "Mayor: City might 'rethink deal.'" In the first two weeks of the monitorship, Cincinnati city officials used and inflamed media-created confusion over its cost and duration to threaten withdrawal and to reject the imposition of the court-appointed monitor. (See Media Coverage, October 13-23.)

Third, evidence that the city used the "billing dispute" as a smokescreen is readily available. As revealed shortly after my resignation, even as city leaders were decrying our bill as "outrageous", the city was paying its own outside lawyer in the racial profiling case greater amounts and at a far higher rate for the same kinds of services.

The truth, as I said in my resignation letter on November 13, is that I had "become a lightning rod for the resistance the City government and Cincinnati Police Department have towards the idea of being monitored, especially under the leadership of and direction of someone who had no allegiances."

It is time to set the record straight. As Robert Houtman, formerly of Kalamazoo County, Michigan, pointed out, conflict is inherent in the kind of work a monitor does, which often involves firing inefficient managers, reorganizing and cutting the budgets of existing bureaucracies, and forcing those who are resistant to change to comply with the law.63 It is not uncommon under these circumstances for elected officials and others to use budget and billing issues, and personal attacks to discredit the monitor.

On October 27, Michael Miller, chief of staff of the city's administration office, asked me to submit my expenses to date so that, in lieu of a contract, the city could authorize payment under a "moral obligation ordinance."64 I was very intent at that time on establishing the monitorship in Cincinnati under adverse conditions, since the City had already set the stage to contest Judge Dlott's choice; compiling an itemized bill was not high on my list of priorities. But representatives of the Court, the DOJ, and especially Justice Douglas urged me to immediately bill the city for all expenses—not only for air travel and local office set-up, but also fees to date for services of our twelve team members. They argued that my work under the Collaborative Agreement did not even require a contract.65

Justice Douglas argued that if ILPP submitted a bill in the absence of a contract, it would force the city's hand: The City Council would either pay my bill or take it to the Court. If they went to the Court, Judge Dlott would order the city to place some or all of the payment in an escrow account, as she had previously done for the plaintiffs' attorneys.66 Following this advice from my "Ohio representative," over the weekend of November 2-3, I drafted a detailed, 11-page itemized bill for all expenses and hours of service to date for the ILPP team, totaling $55,000, most of it in fees and air travel. Unfortunately, the draft was inadvertently transmitted to the city on November 4 replete with misspellings, including the names of key people. An ILPP staffer believed I had thoroughly reviewed the bill, and I thought he had.

Justice Douglas's prediction proved incorrect. Instead of taking the bill to the Court, the city immediately took it to the media. Reaction was instantaneous, and a firestorm of negative publicity quickly engulfed the Monitorship.67 On the afternoon of November 4, Mayor Luken emailed me: "I have had the opportunity to review your bill, and Oh, my God! I repeat, please reconsider your engagement here. I have told the City Manager not to pay this." He continued: "By the way, I am sure the City Council will support this instruction to you: STOP!!! [emphasis in original]."68

By November 5, our bill was available on local media websites.69 Mayor Charles Luken and the Cincinnati City Council threatened to withdraw from the Collaborative Agreement unless I was fired.70 On November 6, the City Council voted unanimously to challenge my appointment as Independent Monitor; they voted not to pay my bill and ordered me to stop working.71 The text of Mayor Luken's angry emails to me appeared on the Enquirer's website.72 Councilman Pat DeWine issued a press release: "This cannot be tolerated. Dr. Kalmanoff has shown a complete lack of respect for the taxpayers that will be forced to pay his bills. He has not been forthright with the public and has demonstrated that he cannot be trusted to operate within the terms of the agreement he was selected to monitor."73 Councilman Chris Monzel said: "Dr. Kalmanoff sounds like Dr. Ripoff."74 I am derided for several minor items in the bill, and cartooned as an outsider out of control.75 Criticisms singled out three specific items in the bill:

Representatives of the other parties quickly and vociferously objected to the city's unilateral and peremptory attempt to fire the monitor.

Juleana Frierson of the BUF believed that "City officials deliberately mishandled the situation to sidetrack making police reforms" and that they were trying to "mislead the public into thinking the city controls the process."80

Plaintiffs' attorney Ken Lawson said, "They may not want to pay. They may not like the fact that they have to pay, but they will."81 The Collaborative Agreement "takes a lot of control from [elected officials], and puts it in the hands of all four parties standing equally."82

ACLU attorney Scott Greenwood said: "The city doesn't have the authority to make any demands on the monitor and doesn't have the option of not paying Dr. Kalmanoff's bills. The reason we filed a lawsuit instead of working with the city's political system is to put an end to the city's practice of making promises and not following through. Throughout the nearly 18-month period since settlement talks began, city officials have been resistant to implementing reforms. If the city had been serious about systemic police reform during the last 30 years, they wouldn't find themselves here today."83 The City could not "just opt out" of the agreements, Greenwood concluded. "It is a binding court order enforced not only by the judge but by the U.S. Department of Justice."84

The DOJ later confirmed that the city had no authority over the monitor; a strongly-worded letter from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Driscoll said: "The city may not unilaterally alter the role of the independent monitor, or any other provision of the MOA. For the city to publicly suggest otherwise, or act in any way that interferes with the ability of the independent monitor to carry out the responsibilities of that position, or threatens the independence of that office, violates the legally binding commitments to the United States the city made when it signed the MOA."85

A November 6 editorial in the Enquirer and a follow-up story on November 11 were damaging to me personally, attacking my reputation and that of ILPP. They presented selective, one-sided, distorted and false allegations from dissatisfied previous clients. Here is my response.

Wednesday, November 6- "Dlott's choice; Council choking on Dr. Kal."86

The Enquirer editorial asked, "Did anyone check this guy's references? Judge Dlott won't say. I will take that as a strong doubt." Of course the Judge would not respond to such a question. As was well known to all concerned, the Judge selected us from seven finalists for the job, all of whom were scrutinized by the parties. In fact, as revealed later, ILPP was one of the City's own three finalists! "With just a few phone calls," the editorial continues, "I found people in Kalamazoo who fired him, and published accusations in Akron that his consulting report was 'fundamentally flawed and riddled with distortions and falsehoods.'" In fact, the Enquirer itself had referred to our jobs in Kalamazoo and Akron in a news story the day after we were appointed, in a relatively balanced account that generated no flurry of adverse publicity. And the November 11 story quoted Summit County Assistant Sheriff Larry Givens, the Akron police chief when we did our study there, as saying that the study "pointed to needed changes. It was a sound report and I think people got their money's worth."87 Most revealingly, the editorial expressed the paper's disdainful attitude toward the Collaborative Agreement itself, calling it "a hurry-up deal to settle bogus profiling lawsuits that were not even settled."

Monday, November 11- "Monitor no stranger to controversy."88

This story quoted Ed Dees, a Planning Commission official from Tampa (Hillsborough Co.): "[Kalmanoff] found out he wasn't going to be making any money on the contract, so he did everything he could do to get out of it." Dr. Kalmanoff quit, Dees alleged, "because he severely underbid the job. He wanted to make a whole damn bunch of money and he didn't want to do anything for it." This is not true. In fact, ILPP had successfully completed two jobs for Tampa (Hillsborough Co.), a jail population study and a law and justice assessment, and had received many emphatically positive client letters. In the third project, an independent performance audit of the Hillsborough County Planning Commission, Mr. Dees and the Planning Commission director refused to permit independent interviews or data collection for our audit, leaving us no choice but to withdraw from the contract. The article's reference to ILPP's work in San Joaquin County cited the only complaint about our work there, from the head of an agency whose program we recommended for elimination. The article does not mention the many other references—all positive—that ILPP received regarding our work there, from San Joaquin County Supervisors, Administrators, Chief of Police, Sheriff-Coroner, District Attorney, Presiding Judge, and community business leaders. (These positive letters, as well as the one negative letter, can be found on ILPP's references page.)

Subsequent stories repeated only negative comments, giving the public the impression that the ILPP left the majority of its clients upset and dissatisfied. This is not even remotely true, as a cursory review of more than 100 client letters demonstrates. The "billing issue" did not end with my resignation. Further derogatory accounts appeared (for example an Enquirer editorial on December 21 branding me as a "fee-gouger") as I sought payment, ultimately unsuccessfully, for the fees and expenses of the monitorship.


  1. See list in Horn, "Monitor has experience."
  2. Korte, "List of Candidates."
  3. Anglen, "Judge names police" reported that Dlott's announcement "surprised" the parties. City Manager Valerie Lemmie acknowledged that the city was "not apprised" of the Judge's decision until the day of the news conference.
  4. Anglen, "Judge names police."
  5. Osborne, "Parties Rally to."
  6. Osborne, "Parties Rally to"; see also Anglen, "Judge names police."
  7. Anglen, "Judge names police." See also Enquirer, "Some key members."
  8. Enquirer editorial, 10/12.
  9. Angry "letters to the editors" and emails from citizens critical of me and the ILPP began shortly the Post and Enquirer stories of October 22 and 23; see, e.g., Email, Ndowjones101@aol to Kalmanoff, October 25, 2002, 10:17 am: "Cincinnati taxpayers question the motives and impartiality of Dr. Kalmanoff. The Law Committee meeting was an example of an ego out of control and the disrespect to our city officials.... You cannot be trusted."
  10. See, e.g., Channel Cincinnati, "Police Reform Monitor."
  11. Prendergast, "Lesson Learned: Sides"; Channel Cincinnati, "Questions Arise Over"; Osborne, "Monitor pay is"; Osborne, "City: We're not"; Goetz, "On agenda: How"; Garretson, "Still waiting on"; Business Courier, "Council should try"; Osborne, "Monitor former U.S."; Osborne, "Sides agree: Don't"; Bay, "Fighting Fire with"; Perry, "Judge: No more."
  12. Email, A. Valiente to Kalmanoff, November 5, 2002, 11:05 am; Business Courier, "Council approves motion."
  13. McKee, "Cincinnati City Council."
  14. Anglen, "Lawyer's bill tops."
  15. Martin subsequently resigned. Osborne, "City consultant resigns."
  16. Anglen, "Police discipline unequal."
  17. Horn, et. al, "Former officer sues"; Perry, "Suit: Chief trying."
  18. Aldridge, "Urban League joins." On animosity between the parties, see also Knight, "Unsettled Feeling: If."
  19. Aldridge, "Urban League joins"; Channel Cincinnati, "Twitty Takes To"; Osborne, "City made effort."
  20. Prendergast, "Twitty case: How"; see also "Twitty Affair Timeline" and McCaine, "Twitty plea deal."
  21. Perry, "FOP: Appoint Twitty"; Prendergast, "Police union wins."
  22. Prendergast, "Black officers blast."
  23. Coolidge, et al., "Allen admits to"; Salvato, "Affair and Lawsuit."
  24. McCaine et al., "Lt. Col. Twitty's"; Prendergast, "Police union wins.
  25. The City Attorney prepared a second contract November 7, 2002, which placed even more constraints on the Monitor than the city's first proposed contract. Internal ILPP Memorandum, November 7, 2002.
  26. Osborne, "Monitor former U.S.." For the Court's order describing Green's payment, see Enquirer, "Text of the."
  27. Anglen, "City to turn"; see also Anglen, "Lawyer's bill tops."
  28. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein to Rita McNeil, City Solicitor, Don Hardin and Steve Lazarus [FOP], October 28, 2002.
  29. Email, Michael Rich to Kalmanoff, October 30, 2002, 1:58 pm.
  30. Internal memoranda, November 8, 2002; email, Kalmanoff to Michael Rich, November 8, 2002, 2:57 pm; email, Kalmanoff to [name omitted], November 11, 2002, 1:06 pm.
  31. Korte, "First choice for."
  32. Korte, "First choice for."
  33. Korte, "First choice for."
  34. Email, [Justice] Andy Douglas to Kalmanoff, October 14, 2002, 9:22 pm; Post, "Activist on ethics."
  35. For example, I invited Justice Douglas to accompany me to a meeting with the Fraternal Order of Police, on the condition that he let me speak for the Monitorship. Although he promised to say nothing substantive, during the meeting Justice Douglas inserted himself into the conversation and made several problematic commitments to the FOP on behalf of the Monitorship. Internal ILPP memoranda, November 3, 2003, 5:53 pm; email, Kalmanoff to Robert Wandruff, November 4, 2002, 6:13 pm; Internal ILPP memoranda, November 9, 2002; Email, Kalmanoff to Douglas, November 10, 2002, 8:27 pm.
  36. Justice Douglas, for example, granted several interviews with reporters for the Post and the Enquirer, though I had asked him to allow me to speak to the press. See, e.g., Osborne, "City to Monitor"; Anglen, "Monitor's cost could"
  37. Post, "Activist on ethics."
  38. Korte, "First choice for"; Osborne, "Monitor former U.S."
  39. Osborne, "Green: City dragging." The text of the report can be read online at <>.
  40. See, e.g., Jones, "Monitor: More reforms"; WCPO 9News, "Collaborative Monitor"; Osborne, "Ruling: FOP can't"; WCPO 9News, "Federal Monitor Files"; Osborne, "Racial justice monitor."
  41. Horn, "Process slow, but."
  42. Aldridge, "Urban League joins."
  43. Collaborative Agreement, Section VIII. "Miscellaneous Provisions," 130. Anglen also interviewed Justice Andrew Douglas, who explained the costs of the two agreements in almost identical terms; see Anglen, "Monitor's cost could"
  44. In its Memorandum of Agreement, the DOJ agreed to give the city "technical assistance in locating and obtaining funding" for improvement expenses above $100,000. The city requested $13 million for the new officer tracking and monitoring computer system requested by the DOJ. Unfortunately, on October 23 the DOJ announced that it would only give the city $315,000 for those expenditures. See Anglen, "City officials disappointed."
  45. Collaborative Agreement, Section VIII. "Miscellaneous Provisions," 126 and 130; City of Cincinnati, "Request for Application to Serve as Independent Monitor," p. 5.
  46. Anglen, "Monitor's first steps."
  47. Anglen, "Monitor's cost could."
  48. Anglen, "Monitor's cost could."
  49. Anglen, "Monitor's cost could."
  50. Anglen, "Monitor's cost could."
  51. Anglen et al., "Council irked by."
  52. Anglen, "Mayor: City might"; WCPO 9News, "Cincinnati Monitor Meets"; Osborne, "Monitor pay could."
  53. Internal ILPP Memoranda, in email, Kalmanoff to Saul A. Green, January 12, 2003.
  54. Anglen, "Mayor: City might."
  55. Email, Anglen to Kalmanoff, October 22, 2002, 7:16 pm.
  56. City of Cincinnati, "Request for Application to Serve as Independent Monitor," p. 9.
  57. See, e.g., Osborne, "Green: I'll be."
  58. Anglen, "Mayor: City might"; the Post made the same error in Osborne, "Monitor pay could."
  59. Osborne, "City to Monitor."
  60. Anglen, "Mayor: City might"; see also WKRC, "Council To Vote"; Business Courier, "Council approves motion."
  61. See, e.g., Osborne, "Luken: Monitor bill"; Kettler, "Cincinnati Gets Big"; WCPO 9News, "Monitor To Appear"; Business Courier, "Council approves motion"; Anglen, "New monitor demanded"; WKRC, "Council To Vote"; Channel Cincinnati, "City Officials: Kalmanoff"; Channel Cincinnati, "'Special K' Leaves"; Channel Cincinnati, "Opposition To Kalmanoff"; Bronson, "Team up to."
  62. See, e.g., Cornwell, "Cincinnati police monitor"; New York Times, "Ohio Community Consultant"; Osborne, "Reece: Jones could"; Korte, "Council members defend"; Osborne, "Sides meet to"; Anglen, "New Cincinnati police"; Osborne, "Monitor former U.S."; Osborne, "Sides agree: Don't"; Osborne, "City made effort"; Osborne, "Green: I'll be"; Law Enforcement News, "A new perspective."
  63. Anglen, "Monitor no stranger."
  64. Email, Michael Miller to Kalmanoff, October 27, 2002, 4:14 pm.
  65. See, e.g., email, Kalmanoff to Michael Rich, October 24, 2002, 8:25 pm, email Michael Rich to Kalmanoff, October 25, 2002, 11:06 am, October 25, 2002, 11:56 am; email Kalmanoff to [Justice] Andy Douglas, October 25, 2002, 8:50 am, 5:00 pm; email, Kalmanoff to Tammie Gregg (DOJ), October 25, 2002, 9:01 am.
  66. Email, Michael Rich, Clerk to Judge S. Dlott, October 25, 2002, 11:06 am; Email, Kalmanoff to A. Douglas, October 25, 2002, 8:50 am; Email, Kalmanoff to M. Rich, October 25, 2002, 8:52 am; Email, Kalmanoff to Tammie Gregg, DOJ, October 25, 2002, 9:01 am; Email, M. Rich to Kalmanoff, October 25, 2002, 11:56 am; Internal ILPP memorandum, November 6, 2002.
  67. See, e.g., Osborne, "Luken: Monitor bill"; Kettler, "Cincinnati Gets Big"; WCPO 9News, "Monitor To Appear"; Business Courier, "Council approves motion"; Anglen, "New monitor demanded"; WKRC, "Council To Vote"; Channel Cincinnati, "City Officials: Kalmanoff"; Channel Cincinnati, "'Special K' Leaves"; Channel Cincinnati, "Opposition To Kalmanoff"; Bronson, "Team up to."
  68. Email, C. Luken to Kalmanoff, November 4, 2002, 2:06 pm.
  69. See, e.g., Channel Cincinnati, "Collaborative Monitor Submits"; McKee, "Cincinnati City Council."
  70. McKee, "Cincinnati City Council."
  71. Email, A. Valiente to Kalmanoff, November 5, 2002, 11:05 am; Business Courier, "Council approves motion."
  72. See Enquirer, "E-mails between mayor"; see also McKee, "Cincinnati City Council" and Channel Cincinnati, "Collaborative Monitor Submits"; both have links to the bill.
  73. Business Courier, "Council approves motion."
  74. Kettler, "Cincinnati Gets Big."
  75. Prendergast, "Lesson Learned: Sides"; Channel Cincinnati, "Questions Arise Over"; Osborne, "Monitor pay is"; Osborne, "City: We're not"; Goetz, "On agenda: How"; Garretson, "Still waiting on"; Business Courier, "Council should try"; Osborne, "Monitor former U.S."; Osborne, "Sides agree: Don't"; Bay, "Fighting Fire with"; Perry, "Judge: No more."
  76. Email, Michael Rich to Kalmanoff, January 17, 2003, 16:07 pm.
  77. See, e.g., Enquirer, "Mayor Luken Wants."
  78. See Aldridge, "NAACP hears economic"; NAACP, "Freedom Under Fire," Freedom Fund Dinner program: "Alphonse 'Al' Gerhardstein, Wright Overstreet Award for Community Service," p. 14, "Kenneth L. Lawson, Wright Overstreet Award for Community Service," p. 18, "Scott T. Greenwood, , Wright Overstreet Award for Community Service," p. 16.
  79. Kettler, "Cincinnati Gets Big"; WCPO 9News, "Monitor to Appear."
  80. Osborne, "Monitor's $55K bill."
  81. Channel Cincinnati, "'Special K' Leaves."
  82. Channel Cincinnati, "Opposition To Kalmanoff"; McKee, "Cincinnati City Council"; see also Bronson, "Team up to"; Post, "An Expensive Crop."
  83. Osborne, "Monitor's $55K bill"; Anglen, "New monitor demanded."
  84. Anglen, "New monitor demanded."
  85. Department of Justice letter, November 12, 2002.
  86. Bronson, "Dlott's choice; Council."
  87. Anglen, "Monitor no stranger."
  88. Anglen, "Monitor no stranger."


Kevin Aldridge, "NAACP hears economic awareness talk," Enquirer, October 12, 2002, <>.

Kevin Aldridge, "Urban League joins boycott over black cop's suspension," Enquirer, July 16, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "City officials disappointed in DOJ help," Enquirer, October 31, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "City to turn over settlement money," Enquirer, July 17, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen and Gregory Korte, "Council irked by $7M remark. Monitor's spending cap disputed," Enquirer, October 17, 2002.

Robert Anglen, "Judge names police monitor," Enquirer, October 11, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Lawyer's bill tops monitor's fees," Enquirer, November 17, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Mayor: City might 'rethink' deal," Enquirer, October 23, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Monitor no stranger to controversy," Enquirer, November 11, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Monitor's cost could go higher," Enquirer, October 16, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Monitor's first steps: Hit ground listening," Enquirer, October 13, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "New Cincinnati police monitor could be picked by next week," Enquirer, December 7, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "New monitor demanded," Enquirer, November 6, 2002, <>.

Robert Anglen, "Police discipline unequal," Enquirer, August 5, 2002, <>.

Monica Bay, "Fighting Fire with Fire," LawFirmInc, August 4, 2004, <>.

Peter Bronson, "Dlott's choice; Council choking on Dr. Kal," Enquirer, November 6, 2002, <>.

Peter Bronson, "Team up to fire the monitor," Enquirer, November 11, 2002, <>.

[Cincinnati] Business Courier, "Council approves motion to remove monitor," November 6, 2002, <>.

Business Courier, "Council should try consensus," November 25, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "City Officials: Kalmanoff Is A Rip-Off," November 6, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "Collaborative Monitor Submits First Bill," November 5, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "Opposition To Kalmanoff Continues," November 7, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "Police Reform Monitor: Salary Dispute Could Land In Court," October 16, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "Questions Arise Over How To Replace Kalmanoff," November 14, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "'Special K' Leaves Sour Taste In Leaders' Mouths," November 6, 2002, <>.

Channel Cincinnati, "Twitty Takes To The Airwaves," October 25, 2002, <>.

Sharon Coolidge, Cindi Andrews, and Dan Horn, "Allen admits to affair with employee," Enquirer, August 26, 2004, <>.

Lisa Cornwell, "Cincinnati police monitor resigns," Associated Press, Akron Beacon Journal, November 13, 2002.

Enquirer, "E-mails between mayor and monitor," November 6, 2002, <>.

Enquirer, "Mayor Luken Wants a New Monitor," November 6, 2002.

Enquirer, "Some key members of the monitoring team," October 11, 2002, <>.

Enquirer, "Text of the judge's order," December 18, 2002, <>.

Craig Garretson, "Still waiting on new monitor," Post, November 23, 2002, <>.

Kristina Goetz, "On agenda: How to pay Kalmanoff, how to proceed," Enquirer, November 21, 2002, <>.

Dan Horn and Marie McCain, "Former officer sues Cincinnati," Enquirer, November 9, 2002, <>.

Dan Horn, "Monitor has experience in other cities," Enquirer, October 11, 2002, <>.

Dan Horn, "Process slow, but police monitor stays confident," Enquirer, September 13, 2004, <>.

Steve Jones, "Monitor: More reforms needed," Post, July 2, 2003, <>.

Shannon Kettler, "Cincinnati Gets Big Bill From Man Hired to Oversee Collaborative Agreement," WCPO 9News, November 5, 2002, <>.

Clayton C. Knight, "Unsettled Feeling: If police reform deal holds, don't expect fast change," CityBeat, Vol 8, Issue 28, May 30 - June 5, 2002, <>.

Gregory Korte, "Council members defend ouster," Enquirer, November 20, 2002, <>.

Gregory Korte, "First choice for monitor said 'no'," Enquirer, November 20, 2002, <>.

Gregory Korte, "List of candidates to oversee reforms narrows," Enquirer, June 30, 2002, <>.

Law Enforcement News, "A new perspective on consent decrees?" December 15/31, 2002, <>.

Marie McCaine and Jane Prendergast, "Lt. Col. Twitty's supporters undaunted by indictment," Enquirer, September 4, 2002, <>.

Marie McCaine, "Twitty plea deal brings anger, relief," Enquirer, September 11, 2002, <>.

Tom McKee, "Cincinnati City Council Takes Action Against Court-Appointed Monitor," WCPO 9News, November 6, 2002, <>.

New York Times, "Ohio Community Consultant Resigns," November 14, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "City consultant resigns, will receive $1M for work," Post, November 21, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "City made effort to heal its racial tensions in 2002," Post, December 31, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "City to monitor: Watch costs," Post, October 16, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "City: We're not going to keep quiet," Post, November 20, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Green: City dragging feet on reforms," Post, April 1, 2003, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Green: I'll be under budget," Post, January 10, 2003, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Luken: Monitor bill out of line," Post, November 5, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Monitor former U.S. attorney," Post, December 18, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Monitor pay could derail accord on profiling suit," Post, October 23, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Monitor pay is up in the air," Post, November 14, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Monitor's $55K bill sparks cry for ouster," Post, November 6, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Parties Rally to Police Monitor," Post, October 11, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Racial justice monitor finds city still lagging," Post, May 1, 2004, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Reece: Jones could be monitor," Post, November 16, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Ruling: FOP can't withdraw from pact," Post, October 2, 2003, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Sides agree: Don't pay new bill," Post, December 21, 2002, <>.

Kevin Osborne, "Sides meet to pick monitor," Post, November 22, 2002, <>.

Kimball Perry, "FOP: Appoint Twitty successor," Post, October 23, 2002, <>.

Kimball Perry, "Judge: No more money to monitor," Post, August 6, 2004, <>.

Kimball Perry, "Suit: Chief trying to oust black cops," Post, November 9, 2002, <>.

Post, "Activist on ethics board," December 20, 2002, <>.

Post, "An expensive crop," November 11, 2002, <>.

Jane Prendergast, "Black officers blast FOP president," Enquirer, July 24, 2002, <>.

Jane Prendergast, "Lesson Learned: Sides must work together," Enquirer, November 14, 2002, <>.

Jane Prendergast, "Police union wins a round," Enquirer, October 23, 2002, <>.

Jane Prendergast, "Twitty case: How car wreck came to inflame city's wounds," Enquirer, August 25, 2002, <>.

Albert Salvato, "Affair and Lawsuit Stop the Career of a Promising Prosecutor," New York Times, September 18, 2004.

WCPO 9News, "Cincinnati Monitor Meets With Council; Won't Discuss Staffing Costs," October 22, 2002, <>.

WCPO 9News, "Collaborative Monitor Releases Second Report," July 1, 2003, <>.

WCPO 9News, "Federal Monitor Files Fourth Report," January 15, 2004, <>.

WCPO 9News, "Monitor To Appear Before Cincinnati City Council Today," November 6, 2002, <>.

WKRC, "Council To Vote On Firing Racial Profiling Settlement Monitor," November 6, 2002, <>.